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RECENT DECISIONS
conditions for imposing liability are required as are found requisite
under the Tenement House Law, the Multiple Dwelling Law, and
under common law principles.
Whether California in the future will follow the Pennington
case is a conjectural matter. Nevertheless, in all cases of latent de-
fects arising subsequently to the beginning of the term, California
imposes liability in accord with established principles as exemplified
in the Forrester case.
M. A. S.
TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-FAIR COMMENT.-The plaintiff
is a district attorney. He commenced this action against a news-
paper publisher alleging the publication of two defamatory articles.
The first article stated that a petition had been filed with the gov-
ernor requesting him to name a competent attorney to conduct an
investigation of a case which the plaintiff had handled. The second
article contained a statement of an attorney criticizing the method in
which the plaintiff had handled the aforementioned case, and by in-
nuendo charged the plaintiff with incompetency. Held, complaint
dismissed. The exercise of the right to petition, quoted in the first
article, cannot be a basis for a defamation suit. The statements con-
stituted an honest criticism of a public official in a matter of public
concern, and as such are not actionable. Tracy v. Kline & Son, Inc.,
274 App. Div. 149 (3d Dep't 1948).
Defamation is "the offense of injuring a person's character, fame
or reputation by false and malicious statements." ' Defamatory mat-
ter which is set forth in permanent form such as in writing, consti-
tutes libel.2 Generally, where there has been a libelous publication,
the law will imply malice and infer some damage. However, certain
publications, referred to as "privileged communications" form an ex-
ception to the general rule.3 A "privileged communication" is one
made by a person in the discharge of some legal or moral duty, to
another, who has an interest in receiving it.4 This privilege to pub-
lish defamatory matter is either absolute or conditional (qualified).
Absolute privilege will protect the utterer from liability in a law suit
even though the publication is false, defamatory, and inspired by
malice.5 Because of this, the courts tend to restrict the scope of the
absolute privilege rather than extend it.6 Thus, the courts have
'BLAcx, LAW DIcTIoNARY (3d ed. 1933).
2 SEALY, THE LAW OF TonTs § 169 (1939).
3 Byam v. Collins et al., 111 N. Y. 143, 19 N. E. 75 (1888).
4 Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427 (1871).
5 Hyman v. Press Publishing Co., 199 App. Div. 609, 192 N. Y. Supp. 47
(1st Dep't 1922).
6 Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515 (1922).
1949)
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
strictly confined it to judicial proceedings, legislative proceedings, and
official reports and communications by or to the executive head of a
governmental department. 7 Although absolute privilege will relieve
the publisher from liability to pay damages irrespective of his mo-
tives, malice will destroy a qualified privilege.8
In addition to immunity on the grounds of absolute or qualified
privilege, freedom from liability is granted in cases of "fair com-
ment." "By fair comment is meant that immunity from liability
which the law confers, in the public interest, upon the person who
discusses the character and fitness of office holders and candidates
for public office, or the character, technique, and other qualities of
literary, artistic, dramatic or commercial productions." 9 It seems
that fair comment has been confused with qualified privilege. For
one thing, fair comment may protect any person whereas the qual-
ified privilege extends its protection only to those persons who have
a community of interest in the publication of the defamatory state-
ments.' 0 Proskauer, J., in Foley v. Press Publishing Co., enumer-
ates the elements required to be present before the defendant may
set up the defense of fair comment. He says, "In order that de-
feasible immunity may attach to a publication purporting to be fair
comment on a subject of public interest, it must be (1) a comment,
(2) based on facts truly stated, (3) free from imputations of cor-
rupt or dishonorable motives on the part of the person whose conduct
is criticized, save in so far as such imputations are warranted by the
facts truly stated, and (4) the honest expression of the writer's real
opinion." 11
A comment is not the assertion of a fact. Rather, it is the ex-
pression of the judgment passed upon certain alleged facts by one
after he has considered them; and who while expressing his judg-
ment assumes the allegations of fact to be true.' 2 Thus it has been
judicially determined that the defense does not protect against false
statements of facts or unjustifiable inferences.' 3 On the other hand,
a reasonable inference supported by the facts is permissible as fair
comment . 4
In Hamilton v. Eno, the court declared that the official act of a
public functionary might be freely criticized and that the publisher
7 See note 5 szt pra.
8 Andrews v. Gardiner, 168 App. Div. 629, 154 N. Y. Supp. 486 (lst
Dep't 1920).
9 SEALY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 213 (1939).
10 Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 235 N. Y. Supp. 340
(1st Dep't 1929).
11 Id. at 544, 235 N. Y. Supp. at 351.
12 Sherman v. International Publications, 214 App. Div. 437, 212 N. Y.
Supp. 478 (1st Dep't 1925).
13 Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27, 96 N. E. 84 (1911).




of the statements would not be subjected to liability as long as he
was not actuated by malice. 15 And, in construing what is purported
to be fair comment the courts will allow for idiosyncrasies of style.' 6
The instant case is clearly one of "fair comment." The plain-
tiff was a district attorney and such activities as were related to his
office were subject to criticism by his fellow citizens, so long as the
comments were not actuated by malice. No evidence of malice was
introduced in the case. This case, then, is fully in accord with exist-
ing New York law.
J. F. N.
TORTS - LIBEL AND SLANDER - LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL IN-
JURIES RESULTING FROM MENTAL DISTURBANCE CAUSED BY.-De-
fendant accosted plaintiff on a public street and angrily and loudly
called her a "God damned son of a bitch" and "a dirty crook." As
a result, plaintiff, being then seven months advanced in pregnancy,
suffered a nervous shock which led to further physical injury. Held,
these words not being slanderous per se, plaintiff's failure to allege
special damages was a fatal defect to her case, in the light of the rule
that there can be no recovery for physical injuries resulting from
nervous or mental disturbance caused solely by mere "opprobrious
epithets," however willful or malicious they be, and despite the fact
that defendant knew of plaintiff's weakened condition and intended
to cause her physical injury by his conduct. Bartow v. Smith,
- Ohio -, 78 N. E. 2d 735 (1948).
The instances where recovery has been allowed for intentional
physical injuries resulting from mental anguish induced by willful
or malicious words, not amounting to libel or slander, have been lim-
ited in the law of torts. As was pointed out by the court in the
principal case, such words will not give rise to a cause of action unless
accompanied by an invasion of the seclusion of private premises, un-
lawful threats, or menacing gestures sufficient to constitute an assault.
None of these additional elements accompanied defendant's words in
the principal case.
Recovery for such injuries caused by words so uttered has been
allowed where defendant ran at plaintiff in an angry and threatening
manner, cursing and shaking his fist at her, and shouting, "You are
fooling with the wrong person this time";' where defendants threat-
ened to send plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old school girl, to a reform school
if she did not confess to false charges of unchastity; 2 where def en-
dant insurance company's agent entered plaintiff's home and there
charged her with being a "deadbeat" and deceiving the company with
25 81 N. Y. 116 (1880).
16 Briarcliff Lodge Hotel, Inc. v. Citizen-Sentinel Publishers, Inc., 260
N. Y. 106, 183 N. E. 193 (1932).
1 Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916).
2Johnson v. Sampson et al., 167 Minn. 203, 208 N. W. 814 (1926).
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